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The January 2000 issue of CMJ (31 (2000) 48-49) contained an article with the title There are no 
contradictions by T.G. Ammon. This drew the following comment from Calvin Jongma of Dordt 
College in Sioux Center, IA.  
 
In the article, There are no contradictions, there really are no contradictions. Just a paradoxical 
conclusion generated by a confusion regarding what constitutes a proof or an argument. This 
confusion results from blurring the distinction between logical implication and deducibility. 
These are notions mathematical logicians have adequately distinguished for most of the 
twentienth century, but which many working mathematicians and students of mathematics 
may be less familiar with.  
 
To explain the hoax further (that Aristotelian logic cannot generate any results from 
contradictory sentences), we will distinguish two senses of "argument". In one sense, an 
argument is merely a list of premises with a conclusion that logically follows from them. We will 
call this a premise-conclusion argument. Such a premise-conclusion argument is valid if the 
premises logically entail the conclusion, i.e., if it is impossible for the conclusion to be false 
while the premises are true. Here implication is the issue, not deducibility.  
 
However, we usually mean by an argument something more than the bare-bones premise-
conclusion sequence. In the ordinary sense of the term, an argument is a sequence of 
statements in which the conclusion is actually deduced from the premises in a step by step 
fashion. We will call this more normal sense of argument a proof or deduction. In a formal 
logical setting, each line of a deduction must be generated via stipulated rules of inference, 
each of which is sound (preserves truth). The nature and conclusive character of a deduction is 
determined both by the particular logic being used and also by the deduction system (set of 
inference rules) that are chosen for deriving conclusions from premises. In this second sense of 
an argument, genuine arguing must take place to demonstrate the logical connection holding 
between the premises and the conclusion. The former notion of a premise-conclusion 
argument does not involve any argumentation, only logical relations among sentences and 
connections between their potential truth values. Premise-conclusion arguments are exactly 
what require proof. A deduction of a conclusion from its premises using sound rules of 
inference is the way mathematicians establish validity.  
 
Now, in the premise-conclusion sense of argument, where logical consequences are the issue 
rather than deductive consequences, contradictory categorical sentences X and Xop in 
Aristotelian Logic obviously imply any statement Z that can be stated in the language, just as is 
the case for Sentential or Propositional Logic. Every time X and Xop are both true (never), so is Z. 
The assertion in the article that they do not, therefore, is simply false.  
 
It is true, though, that one cannot deduce anything from a syllogism whose premises are 
contradictories, for the simple reason that, strictly speaking, syllogistic reasoning requires three 
distinct terms. (If this requirement is relaxed, however, so that only two distinct terms occur, at 
least the contradictory argument "Some S are not S" can be deduced using the Aristotelian 
syllogistic form A O O - 2 on the premises X: "All S are P" and Xop: "Some S are not P", even if an 
arbitrary categorical sentence Z cannot be generated.) This conclusion about the limitations of 
strictly syllogistic reasoning should not surprise us; nothing much can be deduced from P&~ P in 
Sentential Logic either if the rules of inference are restricted to, say, the basic rules covering 
conditionals. Proving Z and ~Z from P&~ P requires rules for negation and conjunction. 
Similarly, in Aristotelian Logic, a Reductio Ad Absurdum rule based on the Square of Opposition 
can be introduced, and then any categorical conclusion Z and its contradictory Zop can be 
deduced from the given premises. This is not a syllogistic rule, but then neither are the standard 
immediate inference rules known as Conversion and Subalternation, which are required to 
complete the deduction system for Aristotelian Logic.  
 
So if we think about arguments in terms of logical implication, contradictories do imply 
anything whatsoever, while if we think about them in terms of deductions, they fail to deduce 
anything only if the rules fail to handle proofs by contradiction. This is true for both Sentential 
Logic and Aristotelian Logic. Contradictions are fully as constructive in a robust version of 
Aristotelian Logic as they are in Sentential Logic. Where Aristotelian Logic is limited is in its 
range of expressibility, not in its ability to imply or deduce logical consequences. 
